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Abstract 
It is widely agreed that reactive attitudes play a central role in our practices concerned with 
holding people responsible. However, it remains controversial which emotional attitudes 
count as reactive attitudes such that they are eligible for this central role. Specifically, 
though theorists near universally agree that guilt is a reactive attitude, they are much more 
hesitant on whether to also include shame. This paper presents novel arguments for the 
view that shame is a reactive attitude. The arguments also support the view that shame is a 
reactive attitude in the sense that concerns moral accountability. The discussion thereby 
challenges both the view that shame is not a reactive attitude at all, suggested by 
philosophers such as R. Jay Wallace and Stephen Darwall, and the view that shame is a 
reactive attitude but does not concern moral accountability, recently defended by Andreas 
Carlsson and Douglas Portmore. 





There are a variety of negative emotions a person may experience in the face of a moral 
infraction: resentment, indignation, guilt, fury, fear, disgust, shame, and so on. Philosophers 
often categorize these emotions into two groups: some, including at least resentment, 
indignation, and guilt, are reactive attitudes; others, such as fury and fear, are non-reactive 
attitudes. The labels are attached in terms of each emotion’s relation to moral responsibility. 
Reactive attitudes, unlike non-reactive attitudes, target participants of the practices 
involving holding each other, and holding oneself, morally responsible. The propriety 
conditions of reactive attitudes, unlike those of non-reactive attitudes, require that their 
target in fact bears moral responsibility. Though non-reactive attitudes may serve important 
functions, according to the standard philosophical view, it is the reactive attitudes that play 
the most central role in those activities involving holding people morally responsible. 
Philosophers debate the scope of reactive attitudes, and it is particularly 
controversial where shame fits in. Is shame a reactive attitude? Though Strawson’s (1962) 
seminal paper on reactive attitudes endorses a positive answer, the view has been frequently 
challenged. Wallace (1994) restricts reactive attitudes to only resentment, indignation, and 
guilt, but excludes shame, because shame is not constitutively linked to ‘holding oneself to a 
demand’ (241) as guilt is. Darwall (2006) also excludes shame in his second-personal 
framework, arguing that shame inhibits the kind of ‘second-personal engagement’ (72) that 
is, according to Darwall, central to the interpersonal functional role of reactive attitudes. 
The assumption that excludes shame as a reactive attitude also seems implicit in many other 
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theorists’ work, given the disproportionate attention they choose to devote to guilt over 
shame. Just as one example, Clarke (2013, 2016) offers a defense of retributivism based on 
the idea that responsible wrongdoers deserve to feel guilt, but he very quickly dismisses the 
relevance of shame, claiming that it is not ‘a matter of justice’ (2016: 128) that one feels 
shame about failing to live up to certain standards.  
Another possible answer goes beyond the simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’, but rather appeals to a 
distinction between different senses of reactive attitudes according to their connections to 
different senses of moral responsibility. Watson (1996) has distinguished between 
attributability and accountability concepts of responsibility. Here is a rather minimal way to 
understand the two concepts, when applied to things that are morally bad or morally wrong, 
namely, things that we are negatively morally responsible for: A person is morally responsible 
for X in the attributability sense just in case X reveals her evaluative commitments, namely, 
what she values. Sometimes attributability is defined in terms of whether X reflects one’s 
substandard moral character or traits. I am inclined to think the definition in terms of 
evaluative commitments is more plausible, but I expect the arguments and views in the 
current paper to apply to the character-based definition of attributability just as well as it 
applies to the value-based definition. By contrast, a person is negatively morally responsible 
for X in the accountability sense just in case X provides a pro tanto moral reason (or at least 
a pro tanto reason that is understood within our practices to be moral) for other people to 
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hold resentment or indignation toward her.1 It is also commonly held that, if a person is 
negatively morally responsible for X in the accountability sense, then she is morally 
blameworthy for X, which further entails that there is a pro tanto moral reason (or at least a 
pro tanto reason that is understood within our practices to be moral) for other people to 
blame her.2 This does not always give rise to an all-things-considered reason to blame, 
because there may be contexts where the pro tanto moral reason is overridden, e.g. when 
the potential blamer lacks the standing to blame. Sometimes accountability is defined in 
terms of more substantial conditions such as whether the person deserves sanction in virtue 
of X or whether X violates an interpersonal demand. I will proceed with the more minimal 
formulation of accountability, and address these more substantial views about accountability 
in section 4. On the basis of the distinction between attributability and accountability, 
Carlsson (2019) and Portmore (2019a, 2019b) defend an intriguing position that shame is a 
reactive attitude but it is concerned with the attributability rather than accountability sense 
of moral responsibility; guilt, they suggest, is concerned with accountability instead. Hence, 
we have three available answers to the question raised in the beginning: exclusivism, the view 
that shame is not a reactive attitude at all; inclusivism, the view that shame is a reactive 
 
1 This involves some simplification. Some have thought that accountability only entails a conditional pro 
tanto reason to hold the negative reactive attitudes (see Nelkin 2016). 
2 Theorists disagree on what blame is. On my view, blame at least includes resentment and indignation 
(blaming attitudes) and the outward manifestations of resentment and indignation (blaming behaviors). 
But I will stay neutral about whether there can be other forms of blame as well. Although I will not try 
to argue for it here, I am inclined to think that the mere judgment of a fault in one’s conduct—that is, 
what Watson calls ‘aretaic blame’ (1996: 238)—is not yet sufficient to count as blame. 
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attitude in the sense that concerns moral accountability; and divisionism, the view that 
shame is a reactive attitude but not in the sense that concerns moral accountability. 
In this paper, I aim to advance novel arguments for inclusivism, what has now 
become the heterodox view in the literature.3 Throughout the paper, I will assume a 
commonly accepted picture of reactive attitudes: their targets are the good will, ill will, or 
indifference of moral agents as participants of those practices involving holding each other, 
and holding oneself, morally responsible; and their propriety conditions are as follows: it is 
appropriate to hold a reactive attitude toward a person just in case the person is morally 
responsible for something. We can then distinguish between attributability-tied reactive 
attitudes and accountability-tied reactive attitudes. The former kind of attitudes is appropriate 
toward a person just in case the person is morally attributable for something, whereas the 
latter kind of attitudes is appropriate toward a person just in case the person is morally 
accountable for something. There has been a debate about what exactly the appropriateness 
consists in, and whether it means the same relation for attributability-tied and 
accountability-tied attitudes (e.g. Shoemaker 2017; Carlsson 2019; Portmore 2019a, 
2019b). I will not take a stand on this controversy. Rather, my approach is to start from 
two assumptions that I believe different parties in the debate would agree on. First, the 
propriety condition for attributability-tied reactive attitudes is the fitting condition of the 
 
3 There are important exceptions. Watson (2014) offers a brief but insightful defense of inclusivism. 
Shoemaker distinguishes between different senses of responsibility, but claims what he calls ‘agential 
shame’ in fact ‘cuts across all categories’ of moral responsibility, including attributability, answerability, 
and accountability (2014: 26). 
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emotion, which further involves having correct representations. Note that this alone does 
not ensure that we have any moral reasons to hold the emotion, since many ordinary fitting 
conditions do not entail any moral reasons at all, for example, when a joke is fitting because 
it is funny. Second, the propriety condition for accountability-tied reactive attitudes should 
provide moral reasons, or at least reasons that are understood within our practices to be 
moral, to hold the attitude. This is compatible with both the claim that it is not a fitting 
condition at all (Carlsson 2019) and the claim that it is still a fitting condition but gives rise 
to moral reasons due to the fact that the content of the accountability-tied attitudes is 
always about desert, a moral-reason-giving notion (Portmore 2019a, 2019b). 
Another preliminary point concerns what it exactly means to say that shame is a 
reactive attitude. Does it mean some particular tokens of shame are reactive, or the general 
emotional type is as such? I am inclined to endorse both. There are some particular tokens 
of shame as accountability-tied reactive attitudes, and, as a further point, those tokens 
belong to an emotion type that we can properly refer to as an accountability-tied reactive 
attitude. It is worth noting that, however, we may have to do some conceptual 
regimentation to single out this type of shame, perhaps as ‘moral shame’ or ‘agential shame’, 
in order to exclude, for instance, physical shame about one’s bodily features—which 
intuitively falls outside the domain of reactive attitudes. But another possibility is that 
shame is a kind of accountability-tied reactive attitude, even though it has some 
subcategory, such as physical shame, that we rarely have moral reason to hold and is thereby 
rarely appropriate. This is a choice point, I think, that ultimately depends on how we 
individuate psychological kinds, a difficult task that I will leave aside. Rather, my thesis is 
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that either shame or a subcategory of shame is an accountability-tied reactive attitude. If 
the thesis holds, this would be a success for the inclusivist, since the current defenders of 
exclusivism or divisionism apparently think neither shame nor a subcategory of shame 
counts as an accountability-tied reactive attitude. 
2. Shame and Guilt: Intertwinedness and Differentiation 
Here is a first attempt to develop an argument for inclusivism. Note that both exclusivism 
and divisionism presuppose that shame and guilt are quite distinct. But this appears to be in 
tension with the phenomenology that shame and guilt are deeply intertwined with each 
other. On my usage of the term, two emotions are deeply intertwined with each other when, 
in a wide enough range of cases, they are overlapped, undifferentiated, and convertible to each 
other. First, overlapping means that, in many cases, the two emotions are both experienced 
by a person and often come and go together. Second, they are undifferentiated in the sense 
that, in many cases, a person does not differentiate between the two emotions, and, upon 
reflection, it can be hard for a person to tell which of the two emotions she feels. Finally, 
they are convertible to each other such that intense feelings of one emotion sometimes shift 
over and become the other, and/or the other way around. Shame and guilt satisfy all three 
conditions, as supported by both reflection on ordinary experiences and empirical evidence. 
(i) Though shame and guilt can come apart, they significantly overlap in a large number of 
cases. This is further supported by experiments showing that only very few antecedents 
uniquely elicit either shame or guilt, whereas a large majority of antecedents elicit both 
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(Keltner & Buswell 1996; Tangney 1992). (ii) We can find it quite hard to distinguish if our 
emotion is shame, guilt, or both, at least for many cases. From college students to clinical 
psychologists, as Tangney and Dearing (2002) observe, people use ‘shame’ and ‘guilt’ 
interchangeably and perhaps even inconsistently. It is not uncommon at all for people to 
talk in terms of the phrase ‘shame and guilt’ and discuss their sources and effects together, 
with little discrimination between the two emotions. (iii) Guilt experiences appear to be 
able to be converted to shame experiences (e.g. Lewis 1971). These features involving 
intertwinedness may appear to pose a prima facie challenge against exclusivism and 
divisionism, thereby supporting inclusivism. That is, since (1) guilt is an accountability-tied 
reactive attitude, and (2) shame and guilt are deeply intertwined, we should conclude that 
(3) shame is also an accountability-tied reactive attitude. I will refer to this as the 
Intertwinedness Argument for inclusivism. 
Though I will ultimately contend that the intertwinedness argument, when suitably 
revised and supplemented, can pose a strong case for inclusivism, the inference as stated in 
the above form is unconvincing and subject to counterexamples. One may think resentment 
is deeply intertwined with what Pereboom calls ‘fury’, a more primitive kind of anger that 
we share with ‘bears and wolves’ (2014: 147). But resentment is, whereas fury is not, a 
reactive attitude. More generally, the inference seems to overlook the distinction that 
Wallace (1994) makes between natural attitudes and reactive attitudes. Wallace argues that 
inclusivists make the mistake of confusing the two and thinking whatever attitudes that are 
natural to have in interpersonal relationships must be reactive. He then suggests that 
emotions like shame are natural but non-reactive attitudes. Similarly, Wallace might reply 
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that intertwinedness shows that both emotions are natural, but not that they should be 
similarly treated when it comes to categorizing emotions as attributability-tied reactive, 
accountability-tied reactive, or non-reactive. 
Nonetheless, I take it that the intertwined argument can still be modified into a 
forceful, burden-shifting move in support of inclusivism. This is because deep 
intertwinedness between the two emotions should at least shift the burden to those who 
reject inclusivism to show how differences between shame and guilt justify treating only the 
latter as an accountability-tied reactive attitude. This burden is met in the comparison case 
of the difference between fury and resentment. In contrast to resentment, fury involves a 
distinct self-defense mechanism that registers the information that ‘there’s a threat to be 
violently neutralized’ (Pereboom 2014: 147), which plays little role in our responsibility 
practices. The task falling upon us then is to investigate if there are similar reasons to 
differentiate shame from guilt in a manner that justifies categorizing them differently. 
Just as we can differentiate fury from resentment despite their intertwinedness, there 
are ways to differentiate shame from guilt too, in terms of a cluster of features including 
their phenomenology, representational content, and motivational tendency. Here is a rough 
characterization of the major differences in these three regards. The phenomenology of 
shame is an intense painful feeling that can be said to involve a wish to hide or disappear, 
fused with a disruption in thought, a sense of confusion, and sometimes blushing (Lewis 
2008: 748); the representational content of shame is a failure to live up to some norm or 
expectation, where the failure is primarily concerned with one’s substandard self 
(Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski 1994; Tracy & Robins 2006; Tangney, Stuewig, & 
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Mashek 2007; Lewis 2008); the motivational tendency is to dissipate the emotion by 
‘reinterpretation, self-splitting, or forgetting’ (Lewis 2008: 748). In contrast, the 
phenomenology of guilt is a painful feeling, but generally less intense than shame (Tangney 
1995); the representational content of guilt is a particular transgression typically in the form 
of a norm-violating action (Niedenthal et al. 1994; Tangney et al. 2007; Lewis 2008); the 
motivational tendency is to direct the agent to perform a corrective action to repair the 
failure (Lewis 2008: 748). 
Many details of this characterization are controversial and up for debate, but I take 
it to be a good starting point to consider those familiar ways in which shame and guilt can 
come apart. The characterization also fits well with empirical findings. In particular, the 
self-action contrast is widely accepted in social psychology: shame is more concerned with 
failure that reflects one’s substandard self, whereas guilt is more concerned with failure in a 
particular action. Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek put it that shame is ‘a negative evaluation of 
the global self’, whereas the focus of guilt is ‘a negative evaluation of a specific behavior’ 
(2007: 349). Shame brings the agent to see a shortcoming in herself, to think ‘if only I 
weren’t …’, while guilt brings the agent to see a failure in her specific behavior, to think ‘if 
only I hadn’t …’ (Niedenthal et al. 1994). This is ‘the currently most dominant basis for 
distinguishing between shame and guilt’ (Tangney et al. 2007: 349) in the psychological 
literature. In philosophy, many draw a broadly similar self-action distinction between shame 
and guilt as well. For example, Rawls argues shame and guilt have different explanations, 
using the example of a person who ‘cheats or gives in to cowardice’ and feels both guilt and 
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shame (1971: 391). According to Rawls, this person’s guilt is due to the quality of his 
action, but his shame is due to a diminished sense of ‘his own worth’ (1971: 391).  
Let me stress that the self-action contrast does not require the target of shame to be 
only about the self or the target of guilt to be only about actions. We can feel both shame 
and guilt toward an action, but, the self-action contrast suggests, shame about the action is 
more focused on the ways in which the action reflects on the person’s self, whereas guilt 
about the action focuses on the qualities of the transgressing action itself as the locus of the 
emotion. Shame can sometimes be about very local failures as well, for example, when a 
person is ashamed of her fleeting bad thought. However, such shameful thoughts usually 
accompany a further judgment like the following: ‘How can I have such a thought?’ If no 
such judgment would arise for the person, then, I think, we have good reason to doubt if her 
emotion is shame at all. That is, the target of shame seems to be typically (though perhaps 
not always) wrapped up in some of our general character traits or dispositions, even when 
the same object can also be the target of guilt. 
Given that the self-action contrast is the most dominant basis for differentiating 
shame from guilt, the most natural rejoinder to the intertwinedness argument is to use this 
contrast against inclusivism. This is surely not the only possible rejoinder. Many 
philosophers have appealed to other ways of contrasting shame with guilt in order to classify 
only guilt as an accountability-tied attitude. For example, Wallace (1994) argues that guilt 
rather than shame is involved in holding oneself to an expectation or demand; and Darwall 
(2006) suggests that guilt rather than shame exhibits a ‘second-personal’ standpoint. These 
views usually come with a fairly substantial position about why moral accountability is a 
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significant concept for us. I will come back to some of these approaches later and address 
the significance of moral accountability in section 4.  
Now consider the following line of argument. (1) The primary object of concern in 
guilt, but not in shame, is the particular action that constitutes wrongdoing. (2) The only 
things we are ever directly morally accountable for are particular actions that constitute 
wrongdoings. But (3) an accountability-tied reactive attitude must have the same primary 
object of concern as what we are directly morally accountable for. Therefore, (4) shame 
cannot be an accountability-tied reactive attitude, but guilt can. Call this the Action-Based 
Objection to inclusivism. The thought is that, if moral accountability has particular actions as 
the primary focus, then we should think only the emotion that has particular actions as its 
primary focus—guilt but not shame—is an accountability-tied reactive attitude. I think the 
objection has some initial plausibility. In particular, the assumption that we are only ever 
directly accountable for actions is an intuitive and traditional view. After all, how can a 
person be morally accountable if not due to something that she did? How can a person be 
morally blameworthy if she has not done anything wrong? It appears to be a plausible view 
that we are only indirectly accountable for things other than actions, when those things are the 
reasonably foreseeable consequences of what we do. 
But why restrict the scope of moral accountability in this way? One common answer 
is that only actions are within our voluntary control, in the sense that we can choose whether to 
perform some actions. This connects to another, related argument against inclusivism, 
directly from the assumption that voluntary control is a necessary condition for moral 
accountability. The argument goes as follows. (1) Guilt is appropriate only if its target is 
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within the person’s voluntary control, but shame can be appropriate even if its target is 
beyond the person’s voluntary control. However, (2) the only things we are ever directly 
morally accountable for are those within our voluntary control. Given that (3) an 
accountability-tied reactive attitude must have its appropriate condition being restricted by 
the necessary conditions of direct moral accountability, it follows that (4) shame cannot be 
an accountability-tied reactive attitude, but guilt can. Call this the Control-Based Objection to 
inclusivism. Carlsson (2019) and Portmore (2019a, 2019b) have both discussed a similar 
line of argument to defend divisionism.4 Again, I find the objection has strong initial appeal. 
(1) is backed up by both intuitive cases and empirical results. We frequently feel shame 
about our beliefs, desires, or characters, which do not seem to be what we can directly 
choose to alter. Nonetheless, it appears that shame about these targets can be appropriate. 
Tracy and Robins (2006) presented evidence that ‘uncontrollable attributions for negative 
events’ lead to greater shame than guilt, while ‘controllable attributions for negative events’ 
lead to greater guilt than shame (1347). (2) is a traditional and widely accepted picture 
about accountability: we are morally accountable for things that we voluntarily choose. It 
has been suggested that only such things can make blame fair and can make us deserve being 
blamed and feeling painful emotions. (3) also appears to be a reasonable constraint on the 
accountability-tied reactive attitudes.  
 
4 Carlsson appears to endorse the argument, but he does not specify if the relevant notion of control is 
voluntary control. Portmore explicitly claims that the argument only works if control means something 
weaker than voluntary control. 
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Nonetheless, I think both the Action-Based Objection and Control-Based Objection 
should ultimately be rejected. Though they make sense on the assumption that direct 
accountability is only about actions or that direct accountability is only about things within 
our voluntary control, both assumptions should be rejected. Recent work on moral 
responsibility has offered reasons for expanding the scope of direct moral accountability 
beyond particular actions and beyond the domain of voluntary control. A closer 
examination on these developments, I shall argue, in fact lends support to treating shame as 
an accountability-tied reactive attitude. Just as an important facet of our practices of 
holding people morally accountable is more action-directed and thereby more strongly 
associated with guilt, these practices have another important facet that is more self-directed 
and thereby more strongly associated with shame.  
3. Expanding the Scope of Moral Accountability 
There have been prominent defenses of the claim that direct moral accountability does not 
just involve actions or just involve things within our voluntary control. Theorists argue that 
the scope of direct moral accountability should be expanded to include, for example, 
attitudes, character, and the self.5 I contend that, if these defenses are on the right track, then 
 
5 See, e.g. Smith (2005, 2012), Sher (2006), Hieronymi (2008), Graham (2014), Adams (1985), Holroyd 
(2012), Taylor (1976), Westlund (2003). Though some of these authors do not use the term ‘moral 
accountability’, I think this is a fair representation of their view. For example, Sher, Hieronymi, and 
Graham talk in terms of blameworthiness, which is typically associated with accountability; though 
Smith (2005) talks primarily in terms of attributability, she extends the idea to accountability in her 
more recent work (2012).  
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the Action-Based Objection and the Control-Based Objection are undermined, and there are 
instead good reasons to endorse inclusivism.  
To start with, consider three cases as follows: 
Sexist Attitude. Amanda is a physics professor. When she teaches Physics 101, 
she consciously holds the belief that, in her class, male students are much 
more talented than female students in physics. But she neither expresses this 
sexist belief nor performs any discriminatory action based on this sexist 
belief. 
Cold Character. Barbara has a character of cold-heartedness. For example, she 
has strong dispositions to dismiss her friends’ emotions as unimportant, to 
not care about her close family members, and to not sympathize with those 
people who suffer from hard circumstances. But she neither expresses this 
cold character nor performs any cold action based on this character. 
Cruel Self. Claire is a cruel person, and, furthermore, she identifies with her 
cruelness. She desires to see innocent people suffer, and she wants this desire 
to be effective in her actions. But she neither expresses her cruel self nor 
performs any cruel action based on her cruel self.6 
 
6 Here I assume a view like Frankfurt’s (1971), according to which one’s self involves one’s second order 
volitions, that is, those desires one desires to have and to be motivated by. This is not essential to my 
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In all three cases, the agent has a substandard attitude, character, or self without further 
performing any substandard action. Many details of the cases are left open, so the agents 
surely can have some excuses that help them escape being blameworthy. But can there be 
some contexts where they are morally accountable for the attitude, character, or self, in the 
absence of morally accountable actions? That is, does the fact that they did not perform any 
actions on the basis of the attitude, character, or self exclude the possibility of 
accountability? My guess is that people’s intuitions will be varied. Laypeople’s pretheoretical 
intuitions will most likely accompany a sense of confusion: it may initially seem that 
Amanda, Barbara, and Claire can surely be blameworthy, but the fact that they have not 
performed any substandard actions may also generate hesitation for people’s having any 
clear-cut pretheoretical intuitions about the cases.  
Here is a possible reaction upon reflection: Amanda, Barbara, and Claire are 
blameworthy, but only indirectly so. That is, they are blameworthy for the attitude, 
character, or self only to the extent that they were blameworthy for certain actions they did 
before that have the attitude, character, or self as reasonably foreseeable downstream 
consequences. This is a reasonable implication to draw from the cases, and I will consider 
this line of thought later in section 5.1.  
My focus, however, will be on another kind of diagnosis, according to which 
Amanda, Barbara, and Claire can be directly morally accountable, and thereby directly 
 
argument, and I expect that similar cases and arguments can be developed even if one adopts 
alternative reasonable views of the self. 
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blameworthy for the attitude, character, or self. Theorists have provided various reasons to 
support this kind of diagnosis. The first is an argument based on ordinary practices. 
Regardless of our intuitions about the above cases, as theorists observe, we do in our practices 
blame people for their attitudes even in the absence of blameworthy actions, including 
‘attitudes like fear, contempt, admiration, guilt, envy, and resentment’ (Smith 2005: 254), 
beliefs and judgments (Hieronymi 2008), self-centered attitudes (Adams 1985), disrespect 
(Graham 2014), and even implicit attitudes (Holroyd 2012); character and traits (Sher 
2006); and a person’s self (Taylor 1976; Westlund 2003). These blaming practices, just as 
blaming practices based on actions, can be in either emotional forms, like resentment and 
indignation, or behavioral forms, like the outward manifestations of resentment and 
indignation. Though our blaming practices are fallible evidence for blameworthiness, they 
are evidence nonetheless, and a picture that renders inappropriate this wide range of 
blaming practices is hard to defend. The second is an argument based on quality of will, 
which plays a particularly important role in the defenses of responsibility for attitudes by 
Smith (2005) and Hieronymi (2008). They contend that attitudes can indicate a flaw in the 
extent to which one has proper regard for another person’s moral standings and interests. 
This, Smith and Hieronymi suggest, is a sufficient basis for holding resentment or 
indignation toward people like Amanda. A similar line of argument can be extended to cases 
involving character and self too: to the extent that they indicate, or even constitute, a 
substandard quality of will, they are the proper targets of moral accountability. A third, 
related argument concerns the connection between responsibility for action and 
responsibility for attitude, character, and self. Sher (2006) highlights this tight connection 
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by pointing to scenarios where an action’s badness is a ‘near-inevitable’ result of her bad 
character—which, according to Sher, suggests that she should be blamed for the character 
as well (2006: 65). The argument can be extended to cases involving attitudes and self: there 
are scenarios where an action’s badness is a near-inevitable result of one’s substandard 
attitudes, or one’s substandard self, and, as a result, it will appear arbitrary to categorically 
exclude attitudes and self from the domain of direct moral accountability. 
To summarize: We have good reasons to expand the scope of direct moral 
accountability to go beyond actions and include attitudes, character, and self, because (i) it 
is hard to defend a wholesale rejection of the wide range of blaming practices about things 
other than actions; (ii) attitudes, character, and self can indicate substandard qualities of will 
that some argue are sufficient for falling in the domain of moral accountability; and (iii) 
attitudes, character, and self can be so tightly connected to actions that drawing a sharp 
boundary of direct accountability in between is hardly plausible.  
I think that this expansive view on moral accountability, the view that we are sometimes 
directly accountable for things other than actions, including attitudes, character, or self, is 
justified. But it is fair to say this remains controversial. Still, let us take the claim seriously 
for the moment, and consider the further question: If we are directly morally accountable 
for attitudes, character, and self, what does this entail about reactive attitudes? The first 
upshot is that the Action-Based Objection to inclusivism is no longer sound, since it is not the 
case that we are only ever directly morally accountable for actions. Instead, we can be 
directly morally accountable for attitudes, character, and self. All those are typically more 
self-focused than action-focused. This is obvious in the case of character and self, but also 
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rings true in the case of attitudes. Shame about an attitude is typically (though perhaps not 
always) connected with the thought that the attitude is likely to indicate something negative 
about one’s character, self, or commitments; for instance, shame about one’s racist attitude 
is typically connected with a thought that one is likely to lack a strong enough commitment 
against racism. The second upshot is that the Control-Based Objection to inclusivism is also 
going to be undermined. This is because attitudes, character, and the self are rarely within 
our voluntary control. Indeed, some defenders of the expansive view (e.g. Hieronymi, Sher) 
explicitly reject that any control condition is necessary for moral blameworthiness. The 
thought is that the kind of indication of flaws in quality of will is sufficient for moral 
blameworthiness, regardless of control. But another possibility is that accountability still 
requires control, but in a sense weaker than voluntary control. This may be a kind of 
‘rational control’ (Smith 2005: 265) defined by whether something depends on one’s 
rational judgments, or ‘reasons-responsiveness’ control defined by whether one or one’s 
mechanism has a disposition to recognize and act according to the relevant reasons (e.g. 
Fischer & Ravizza 1998). Either way, the requirement of voluntary choice in moral 
accountability ends up being too demanding. We can then agree with the Control-Based 
Objection that the appropriateness condition of shame does not require voluntary control 
but maintain that a weaker control condition—probably that of rational control or reasons-
responsiveness—still restricts the conditions under which shame, or a subcategory of shame, 
is appropriate. As an example, one may argue shame about an event is appropriate, in the 
sense that we have pro tanto reasons to feel shame, only when whether the event occurs 
depends on our rational judgments (in Smith’s sense). So shame about a racist thought can 
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be appropriate on the assumption that whether one has that thought depends on one’s 
rational judgments, whereas we do not even have reasons to feel shame about some of our 
bodily features, which we lack rational control over. 
Further, I think the expansive view on moral accountability in fact provides more 
direct support for inclusivism. Consider the following, widely agreed connection between 
accountability and self-directed reactive attitudes: 
If a person is negatively morally accountable for X, then it is appropriate for 
her to hold reactive attitudes toward herself with regards to X. 
In cases where X is an action, it makes sense to take guilt to be the relevant reactive 
attitude. But if X is an attitude, character, or self, then I am inclined to think that shame 
may be better as a candidate emotion to fill in the conditional. Consider the three earlier 
cases again. It seems to me that the natural and paradigmatic emotion to feel for Amanda is 
shame about her sexist thought, for Barbara is shame about her cold character, and for 
Claire is shame about her cruel self. Guilt, by contrast, seems much less natural. How can 
Amanda feel guilt about a thought, Barbara feel guilt about a character, Claire feel guilt 
about her self, without their feeling guilt about any particular actions? This intuition 
vindicates the self-action contrast. Guilt is indeed primarily directed toward actions, and 
when it comes to attitudes, character, and self, the primary object of concern is more about 
how they reflect the person as who she is, which is better captured by shame rather than 
guilt. 
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The thought is that there is a useful division of labor between shame and guilt that 
we can draw. Both concern moral accountability, but guilt is more about the aspect in which 
one is accountable for particular actions, whereas shame is more about the aspect in which 
one’s being accountable for things—attitudes, character, self, and perhaps some actions—
reflects its root in some substandard features of the agent’s self. Both facets are crucial for 
practices involving moral accountability. Though it may seem that moral accountability is 
always indexed to a particular substandard action, an actual or potential substandard self 
quite often falls in the scope of moral accountability as well. In fact, one common way for 
an individual to downplay a charge of blame is exactly to acknowledge her fault in the 
particular action, but not to in any way acknowledge the fault in her attitudes, character, or 
self. The above picture is desirable because it draws a clear division of labor between guilt 
and shame such that the two emotions play distinct yet interacting roles in our 
responsibility practices. 
To recap, the argument in the current section can be formulated as follows: 
The Expansion Argument for Inclusivism 
(1) The expansive view on moral accountability is correct. 
(2) If the expansive view on moral accountability is correct, then we have 
good reasons to endorse inclusivism. 
(3) Thus, we have good reasons to endorse inclusivism. 
One may respond by either rejecting (1) or rejecting (2), and I will consider the main 
objections along those lines in section 5. It is worth noting that the Expansion Argument goes 
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hand in hand with the Intertwinedness Argument. The intertwinedness argument, as stated in 
the last section, is only convincing when we are shown that the familiar ways in which 
shame and guilt are differentiated fail to justify categorizing shame and guilt differently. 
This is what the expansion argument partly aims to show: the most familiar differentiations 
between shame and guilt, in terms of either the self-action contrast or voluntary control, 
would not justify different categorizations between shame and guilt, but rather show that 
shame and guilt are in charge of different aspects of our accountability practices. The 
intertwinedness argument is thus a convincing move with this supplementation, since, 
unlike in the case of resentment and fury, shame and guilt do not seem to be differentiated 
in ways that can justify different categorizations of the two emotions. From a different 
perspective, we can also view the intertwinedness argument as supplementing the expansion 
argument. One rejoinder people may have against the expansion argument is that, even 
though the most familiar ways of distinguishing shame from guilt do not contradict 
inclusivism, we may still speculate that there are other differentiations waiting to be found. 
However, the fact that shame and guilt are so deeply intertwined with each other renders 
this empirical speculation rather unlikely. More generally, we can combine the Expansion 
Argument and Intertwinedness Argument into a dilemma. On one hand, if one thinks there is 
no useful way of differentiating shame from guilt, then one already has no good resources to 
endorse exclusivism or divisionism, since one should already be convinced by the 
Intertwinedness Argument. On the other hand, if one wants to appeal to the familiar ways of 
differentiating shame from guilt to reject inclusivism, then one should be convinced by the 
Expansion Argument that those differentiations fail to justify categorizing shame and guilt 
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differently. Either way, there are good reasons to endorse inclusivism, regardless of one’s 
substantial view on the nature of shame and guilt. 
4. The Significance of Moral Accountability 
As mentioned earlier, some may still resist inclusivism on the basis of some fairly substantial 
conceptions of moral accountability. They may suggest that the normative significance of 
moral accountability comes from its relation to, for example, desert or demands and 
expectations, and only guilt rather than shame captures this significance. However, I am 
inclined to think that inclusivism is fully consistent with these conceptions of 
accountability. In fact, the earlier arguments may bring these conceptions under a new light 
by locating the division of conceptual labor between guilt and shame in illustrative ways. 
Let’s start with desert. It is widely believed that moral accountability entails desert 
of sanction or reward. Pereboom refers to this as ‘basic desert’, in the sense that ‘the agent 
would deserve to be blamed or praised just because she has performed the action, given an 
understanding of its moral status, and not, for example, merely by virtue of consequentialist 
or contractualist considerations’ (2014: 2). It may be suggested that, because shame is not 
concerned with desert, it should not be an accountability-tied attitude. But why isn’t shame 
concerned with desert? One answer is to again appeal to voluntary control (see Carlsson 
2019): we only deserve adverse treatments for what we have voluntary control of, but shame 
about X can be appropriate even when we cannot voluntarily control X. But this is just the 
Control-Based Objection to inclusivism discussed earlier and faces the same difficulties. 
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Importantly, the inclusivist can reasonably maintain that accountability entails desert but 
deny that desert requires voluntary control. That is, we can pair both accountability and 
desert with weaker senses of control, like rational control or reasons-responsiveness. The 
desert-based objection then loses its force. The common examples against using control to 
restrict appropriate shame are usually those involving the lack of voluntary control, such as 
an attitude or a character that we cannot just choose or decide to alter. But it remains 
plausible that shame, or a subcategory of shame, cannot be appropriate if its object is in no 
way connected to our rational judgments or reason sensitivity at all. On this basis, we can 
maintain that shame, or a subcategory of shame, is in fact concerned with desert. It is also 
worth emphasizing that the deserved treatment should not be identified with harsh 
punishment. Though it is hardly plausible that Amanda, Barbara, and Claire deserve harsh 
punishment for their attitudes, character, and self, it is plausible that they deserve some 
adverse consequences, like other people’s resentment, indignation, and the painful feelings 
of shame—of course, only proportional to how bad their attitudes, character, and self are.  
Now turn to demands and expectations. One may think that the significance of 
moral accountability comes from those interpersonal demands or expectations that we hold 
people account to. Wallace defends exclusivism on the basis of this thought. Wallace 
appears to agree that shame is self-focused; he writes that when feeling shame one typically 
‘sees oneself as being all of a piece’ and ‘thinks of oneself as being thoroughly degraded’ 
(1994: 241). But Wallace then suggests that ‘if one violates a demand that one holds oneself 
to, it will be very hard to think of oneself as all of a piece’ (1994: 241). Assuming that 
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reactive attitudes are instances of holding oneself to a demand, Wallace concludes that 
shame does not count as a reactive attitude. 
However, it is unclear why there cannot be proper demands and expectations about 
the self-centered aspects of a person. On one way of understanding cases like Amanda, 
Barbara, and Claire, they exemplify that we do in our blaming practices hold other people to 
account for what we demand or expect of their attitudes, character, and self. And the most 
natural ways in which we view ourselves in relation to these demands or expectations are in 
the form of shame rather than guilt. To say the least, it is unclear why the function of shame 
cannot be to bring the agent herself to see the force of these self-focused reciprocal 
demands or expectations. Watson (2014) has made a similar objection to Wallace. As 
Watson points out, even if there were ‘pure shame cultures’, people in those cultures would 
still ‘be prone to a vivid sense of mutual expectations’ and ‘recognize obligations to one 
another’ (2014: 29). It is then reasonable to infer that, even in ‘our’ culture, shame or an 
important subcategory of it can involve the kind of demands and expectations that is central 
to accountability practices. One may then ask Watson why we in fact have two distinct sets 
of emotional attitudes—guilt and shame—if they are both concerned with our interpersonal 
demands and expectations. My earlier arguments in this paper help fill in this part of the 
story, since they show that there is still a useful division of labor between guilt and shame. 
Guilt involves holding oneself to more action-focused demands or expectations, whereas 
shame involves holding oneself to more self-focused demands or expectations, including 
those manifested in attitudes, character, and self.  
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I have considered two kinds of substantial conceptions of accountability—in terms 
of desert and interpersonal demands—and examined the plausibility of inclusivism in 
relation to these conceptions. These do not exhaust all possible conceptions, but the two 
examples provide important insights: First, theorists endorsing these conceptions frequently 
assume that accountability is only about actions or only about things within our voluntary 
control. Once these assumptions are rejected, it becomes clear that these conceptions can 
be consistent with, or even lend support to, inclusivism. Second, my earlier arguments for 
inclusivism can help illustrate how shame and guilt are concerned with different aspects of 
our accountability practices under these substantial conceptions of accountability. 
5. Objections and Replies 
5.1. Challenging the Expansive View 
The expansive view on direct moral accountability remains controversial. An overall 
evaluation of this view, in contrast to the more restrictive view on the scope of direct moral 
accountability, can only be done by examining their various theoretical advantages and 
disadvantages and is beyond the scope of the current paper. In this section, I offer a 
response to those who may reject the expansive view. The purpose is to show that even the 
more restrictive view on moral accountability may nonetheless lead to reasons in support of 
inclusivism similar to the ones presented earlier. 
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To start with, note that, though the thesis that we are directly accountable for 
attitudes, character, and the self is fairly controversial, most theorists would agree that we 
can at least sometimes be indirectly morally accountable for an attitude, character, or self when 
and because (i) we are directly accountable for an action or a series of actions, and (ii) the 
formation of the attitude, character, or self is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of that 
action or that series of actions (cf., Fischer & Ravizza 1998). But then we could make a 
similar inference from the expansive view on the scope of indirect moral accountability to 
inclusivism, by examining those cases where we lack epistemic access to the earlier actions that 
we are directly accountable for. Consider a case as follows: 
Lazy Professor. Dan is a mathematics professor. When he teaches Math 101, 
he consciously holds the belief that, in his class, male students are much more 
talented than female students in mathematics. But he neither expresses this 
sexist belief nor performs any discriminatory action based on this sexist 
belief. Further, Dan cannot recall what he did or decided not to do in the past 
that may have caused him more inclined to hold sexist beliefs. Still, it is 
reasonable to believe that Dan did something, such as skipping ethical 
trainings, that made him more likely to hold sexist beliefs. 
What’s special about this case is that the agent cannot really point to the thing that he was 
directly accountable for at an earlier time, though—let’s stipulate—we have enough reasons 
to believe that there is such a thing that made him indirectly accountable for its 
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downstream consequence. Now consider the earlier biconditional between moral 
accountability and reactive attitudes again: 
If a person is negatively morally accountable for X, then it is appropriate for 
her to hold reactive attitudes toward herself with regards to X. 
What are the appropriate negative reactive attitudes for Dan to feel? Perhaps we can say it 
is appropriate for Dan to feel guilt about what he did earlier, but this does not seem to fully 
capture his correct emotional response. Imagine Dan apologizes to the students by saying ‘I 
feel really guilty about what I did earlier—which, I am sorry, I cannot remember what that 
was…’. It seems that such responses are far from satisfying, in the sense that they do not 
meet what we usually expect from agents in those situations. There should be something 
more. I contend that the ‘something more’ here can be captured in their emotional response 
toward the consequence of their directly accountable actions. So Dan should feel some 
negative reactive attitude about his sexist belief, even if he could not remember what he did 
earlier.7 We can then argue that, similar to the reasoning in section 3, shame rather than 
guilt is the more natural and paradigmatic emotion for Dan to feel about his sexist attitude, 
and this provides a good reason to endorse inclusivism. 
 
7 Does this mean there is an asymmetry between guilt and shame, since guilt is appropriate only when 
one is directly morally accountable for an action? I am inclined to answer no. Suppose that Jim 
voluntarily decides to drink and drive but then involuntarily kills a pedestrian. If appropriate guilt is 
only about directly accountable actions, then it follows that Jim’s proper guilt should be only about 
drinking and driving. But it seems to me that he should also feel guilty about the action of hitting the 
pedestrian—an action that he is only indirectly accountable for. Therefore, I tend to think we should 
reject the assumption that appropriate guilt only concerns directly accountable actions.  
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More generally, the link between reactive attitudes and moral responsibility should 
not be restricted to direct responsibility. As an analogy, consider the view that we are only 
directly morally responsible for choices and decisions, whereas responsibility for outward 
behaviors is a more derived notion. Those who believe this view surely should not think that 
the only reactive attitudes are the appropriate emotions toward choices and decisions; they 
will include the appropriate emotions about outward behaviors too. The upshot is that, if 
we are indirectly accountable for attitudes, then we still have good reasons to include shame 
as an accountability-tied reactive attitude. And the antecedent here is widely accepted even 
among those who reject the expansive view on direct moral accountability.8 
5.2. Challenging the Inference from the Expansive View to Inclusivism 
What if one takes for granted the expansive view on direct moral accountability, but 
nonetheless rejects inclusivism? That is, why cannot one maintain that, in contrast to what I 
have suggested, we can feel guilty toward attitudes, character, and self? Why not think 
attitudes, or the processes involving forming attitudes, are themselves a kind of ‘mental 
action’?  
 
8 However, it is worth noting that, on the picture discussed in the current subsection, shame is 
admittedly a less central reactive attitude than guilt, and its status as a reactive attitude is derived. This 
is not a concession that inclusivists would need to make if the expansive view on direct moral 
accountability is correct. 
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Smith (2011), for example, claims that guilty attitudes are in fact fairly common 
phenomenon. She writes that, 
Perhaps we have caught ourselves taking secret pleasure in a close friend’s 
uncharacteristic failure, or feeling distrustful of a loved one’s fidelity, or 
viewing a stranger through the lens of an odious stereotype. Perhaps we have 
received the confidences of another with contempt, or have felt resentment 
rather than gratitude toward someone who has done us a kindness. It is quite 
common, in such cases, for people to say that they feel ‘guilty’ about these 
thoughts and attitudes, even when they are quite sure that they have not 
been, and will not be, expressed or acted upon in any way. The feeling of guilt, 
it seems, attaches to the mere having of these thoughts and attitudes, and is 
not inhibited by the knowledge that these mental states are and will remain 
wholly private. (2011: 235)  
My reply is as follows. Even if we do sometimes feel guilty about these thoughts, this still 
does not justify treating guilt and shame differently when it comes to categorizing them as 
reactive or non-reactive attitudes. Admittedly, the observation does pose a serious challenge 
to my claim that shame is the more natural and paradigmatic emotion to feel when it comes 
to attitudes, character, and the self; however, it still does not accomplish what one needs in 
order to argue against inclusivism, namely, a way of differentiation between shame and guilt 
that justifies treating only the latter as an accountability-tied reactive attitude. If anything, 
the observation almost strengthens the thought underlying the Intertwinedness Argument. 
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Surely, many also feel shame about the above attitudes—taking secret pleasure, distrusting a 
loved one, stereotyping strangers, etc., and, when it comes to attitudes, guilt and shame 
appear even more intertwined than in the case of actions. It is even more common than in 
actions that guilt and shame overlap, are hard to differentiate, and frequently convert to 
each other. We thereby still have not been shown that the intertwinedness can be unraveled 
to support exclusivism or divisionism.9 
5.3. Challenging from the Dark Side of Shame 
A final line of objection to my arguments involves appealing to certain allegedly unique, 
negative features of shame. For example, one may worry that shame is not an ‘autonomous’ 
moral response, in the sense that it reflects not one’s own values but rather the values of 
other people in one’s society. The idea is that shame, even its ‘moral shame’ or ‘agential 
shame’ subcategory, seems to be strongly connected with one’s social position, such as the 
social power and oppression that one is subject to. This would be an argument against 
inclusivism if moral accountability does not involve such social factors. However, there has 
been promising developments of the view that moral accountability has a crucial social 
 
9 We should also be cautious about drawing implications from those feelings we call ‘guilty thoughts’. I 
suspect that guilty thoughts in fact share more similarities with paradigmatic shame attitudes than with 
paradigmatic guilt attitudes. See, e.g. Goffin & Cova (2019), who conduct experiments to show that 
guilty pleasures are ‘not so much about guilt (what people do) but about shame and embarrassment 
(who they are)’ (1151). 
32 
dimension (see, e.g. Strawson 1962; McKenna 2018; Vargas 2018), which shame may be 
especially well-positioned to capture. 
A different but related concern is that the moral relevance of shame is old news. A 
lot have been written on the positive moral value of shame, despite its apparently negative 
features.10 However, the focus there is usually on the moral relevance of shame in general, 
rather than about the particular connection between shame and moral responsibility. Even 
when some theorists (e.g. Manion 2002; Deonna, Rodogno, & Teroni 2012) do discuss this 
particular connection, they do not address some of the more recent developments in the 
moral responsibility literature, including the distinction between attributability and 
accountability, the expansive view on moral accountability, and the relation between direct 
and indirect accountability. My view is that we can establish a firmer defense of inclusivism 
by examining these specific choice-points in a theory of moral responsibility. Another way 
in which my arguments differ from the more general literature on the positive moral value of 
shame is this. My primary goal is to defend a connection between shame and moral 
accountability. I am inclined to think that defending this connection is in addition to, or 
even independent of, defending the positive moral value of shame. After all, there is the 
possibility that our practices involving holding people morally accountable do unfortunately 
have certain negative features and require significant revisions. We should not at the 
 
10 See, for example, Velleman (2001), Calhoun (2004), Nussbaum (2004), Deonna, Rodogno, & Teroni 
(2012), Deonna & Teroni (2011), Manion (2002), Mason (2010), Maibom (2010), Thomason (2015, 
2018). 
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beginning of our theorizing simply assume that whatever emotions central to our 
responsibility practices must be conducive to our being better moral agents, or that such 
practices are flawless, or that they cannot be modified or improved (see Vargas 2013: 76–7). 
This possibility can be easily overlooked when we do not disentangle the goal of defending 
inclusivism on one hand, and that of defending the general moral value of shame on the 
other. 
6. Conclusion 
I have presented novel support for including shame as a reactive attitude in the sense that 
concerns moral accountability, appealing to both the intertwinedness between guilt and 
shame, and the expansive view on the scope of moral accountability. This leads to various 
open questions. Where exactly should the scope of reactive attitudes be drawn? How about 
other self-directed and other-directed emotions such as pride, regret, and disgust? Does 
inclusivism about shame score better or worse once we consider these more general issues? I 
think they all lead to promising future projects, and I expect that the two aspects that I 
have focused on in the context of shame—the intertwinedness and interactions between 
different emotions, and the scope of moral accountability—will remain crucial for answering 
these broader questions. 
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